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Governance aspects of 
foreign exchange interventions 
Paul Moser-Boehm 
Introduction  
This paper provides comparative information on governance arrangements guiding foreign exchange 
interventions, on central banks’ related communications policies, and on the accountability of central 
banks for their intervention decisions. The paper makes use of data from the BIS survey carried out for 
the December 2004 Meeting of Deputy Governors. 
Powers and decision-making 
Allocation of powers in respect of monetary and financial policy is an issue of great significance, over 
which views differ from country to country, and change through time. Legislative reforms in recent 
years have generally given central banks greater operational independence, accompanied by 
increased accountability. Key institutional design issues at the heart of recent and earlier reforms 
include alignment of decision-makers’ incentives with public policy objectives, the coordination of 
interacting elements of public policy, and time-consistency.  
The close linkages between monetary policy and the exchange rate mean that public policy interests 
in each area cannot be treated separately. In principle this ought to lead to institutional designs with 
integrated governance arrangements for monetary policy and exchange rate policy. Yet in a number of 
countries, tensions between different governance arrangements have been carried over from earlier 
structures. In several cases, goal and operational independence have been granted to the central 
bank, but the government has authority over exchange rate policy. The potential for the central bank’s 
domestic policy target to be undermined by a government decision on exchange rate policy is not 
always provided for within legislative or other conflict resolution procedures.   
At the operational level, governance arrangements for foreign exchange interventions also seem 
somewhat less clearly defined and more opaque than those for making monetary policy decisions. In 
addition, foreign exchange interventions are an area where central bank actions remain behind the 
scenes more often than in other areas of conducting policy, for a range of clear and not-so-clear 
reasons. At the margin, this may call for clearer and more detailed related governance procedures 
inside the central bank than for activities that are carried out in the public eye, but detailed information 
on these internal governance mechanisms is not widely available.
1 
Legal basis 
There are two ways to consider the legal grounding of foreign exchange interventions by central 
banks. The first and broader question concerns the regime choice. What are the principal objectives of 
the central bank, and what are its powers in the area of monetary and exchange rate policy? For 
example, is an exchange rate objective set down in the central bank law?
2  And how are the powers to 
                                                       
1   Often, formal statements on governance mechanisms focus on high-level aspects while questions of detail are covered in 
internal rules and procedures that are rarely published.  
2   Of course, the absence of an exchange rate objective is not inconsistent with a central bank conducting interventions, but 
their role and objectives may differ depending on the formulation of the policy objective.  
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decide on the exchange rate regime and to determine exchange rate policy distributed between the 
government and the central bank? For example, does the power to choose the exchange rate regime 
rest with the government, with the central bank having full control over exchange rate policy (deciding, 
for example, on the rate of crawl of a crawling peg, or the width of exchange rate bands in a hybrid 
model)? Or is exchange rate policy a shared responsibility, with, for example, both the government 
and the central bank determining operational objectives? The second, narrower question concerns the 
extent to which the central bank has the power to make foreign exchange interventions, to decide 
when to intervene and by how much, which resources it may use to intervene, who at the central bank 
may make the decision, and if there are specific reporting requirements.  
We first address the broader question. As noted, many central banks have recently been mandated by 
law to pursue a price stability objective, and others choose to pursue such an objective as a concrete 
interpretation of a broader legal mandate. Table 1 shows that the central bank laws of industrialised 
countries often stipulate price stability as the principal objective, or set out a broader or more complex 
objective that combines the value of money, economic growth and overall public welfare (a much older 
tradition). By contrast, the central bank laws of many emerging market economies are of a vintage in 
between: they do not specify the broad objectives that are typical of relatively old central bank laws, 
but are also not so specific as to demand price stability, as has become almost the norm since the 
1990s. Instead, many ask the central bank to maintain the value of the currency, without distinguishing 




Primary objective of the central bank 
Central bank laws of 90 countries and currency areas 
  Preserve internal 
value of currency 
Preserve external 
value of currency 
Preserve value 
of currency 
Broader or more 
complex objective 
25 central banks 
in BIS survey  32%
1 4% 32% 32% 
53 emerging market 
economies  21%  4% 38%  38% 
12 industrialised 
countries  42%  0% 0%  58% 
Total  27% 3% 31%  39% 
1  Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Poland and Turkey.
 
 
This raises the question whether the choice of broader central bank mandates in emerging market 
economies is linked to their higher propensity than industrialised countries to engage in foreign 
exchange intervention. The link could be direct (a higher propensity for intervention could derive from 
the central bank’s interpretation of the objectives specified in the law) or indirect (with the central bank 
law having been designed differently as a result of different needs).
4 There does indeed seem to be 
widespread agreement that emerging market economies display greater aversion to exchange rate 
volatility than the typical floating exchange rate developed economy, as encapsulated by the “fear of 
floating” idea (Calvo and Reinhart (2000)). Against this background it would not be surprising if both 
central bank officials and lawmakers shared a broadly common perspective about the merits of 
                                                       
3   The inflation targeting frameworks adopted by many central banks typically give clear priority to a specific inflation target or 
target band but they are normally not mentioned explicitly in central bank laws.    
4   Differences in the precise wording of the central bank’s primary objective need not be a question of semantics. For example, 
in his statement to the Commission of Inquiry into the Rapid Depreciation of the Exchange Rate of the Rand and Related 
Matters (Myburgh Commission), the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) discussed how the objective in 
the SARB Act and in the Interim Constitution of 1993 (“to protect the internal and external value of the currency …”) 
changed in the Constitution of 1996 (“to protect the value of the currency”), thus placing “greater emphasis or focus upon 
the Bank’s role in striving for domestic price stability” (Mboweni (2002), p 3).  
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attempting to limit exchange rate fluctuations, and the trade-off with other policy objectives that might 
be involved. Hence lack of specificity in the law about the place of exchange rate objectives, and 
decision-making powers related thereto, might not be as large a source of potential confusion and 
conflict as would be the case in other circumstances.  
There is great diversity regarding who has the power to choose the exchange rate regime. In about a 
quarter of the economies participating in the BIS survey, this decision is to be made jointly by the 
government and the central bank. Among the remainder, the following options occur (ordered by 
declining frequency): choice by the central bank; choice by the government; choice by the government 
after consulting the central bank; choice by parliament or the legislature; choice by the central bank 
subject to the agreement of the government; as well as several other variations. This diversity is 
notable and provides substance to the questions raised earlier concerning the extent of a central 
bank’s monetary policy autonomy when the exchange rate regime choice is made elsewhere. 
By contrast, the right to implement exchange rate policy (within the confines of the chosen exchange 
rate regime) is held by the vast majority of the central banks in the survey (78%).
5 In Mexico, the 
central bank may implement exchange rate policy within guidelines set by the government and the 
central bank;
6 in India, Korea and New Zealand exchange rate policy is a joint responsibility of the 
government and the central bank; and in Malaysia it is the prerogative of the government, after 
consulting the central bank. It should be noted that in many countries where governments retain a 
degree of involvement in decision-making on exchange rate policy, legally independent central bank 
decisions can have important consequences for the exchange rate. Thus, for example, a decision by 
the central bank to raise interest rates in pursuit of an inflation target may lead to an exchange rate 
appreciation. While this may be desirable from the perspective of the central bank because it will help 
bring down inflation, it may not be in line with the government’s preferences concerning exchange rate 
policy. It is in such circumstances that an overlap between governance arrangements for monetary 
policy and exchange rate policy becomes significant. 
Turning at last to the power to decide on specific foreign exchange interventions, there is a high - but 
not complete - degree of overlap with the power to conduct exchange rate policy. Who bears the initial 
financial risk and who owns the foreign exchange reserves are additional factors (Annex 1 to this 
paper provides details on the latter). More than 90% of the central banks in the survey have the power 
to decide on interventions, including the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), where exchange rate 
policy is a joint responsibility of the government and the central bank.
7 In Mexico, intervention 
decisions are made jointly by the government and the central bank, and in Malaysia they are made by 
the government after consulting the central bank. Brazil, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, New Zealand, Peru 
and one survey participant that preferred not to be identified are the only economies in the survey 
where the central bank does not own the foreign exchange reserves in full or almost in full. In Brazil, 
they are owned by the government. In Hong Kong, they are held by the HKMA on behalf of the 
government, and the HKMA has the authority to decide on interventions subject to limits set by the 
Financial Secretary. The Bank of Korea has the power to decide on interventions using that portion of 
the reserves which it owns, after consulting the government; while the government has the final say on 
interventions using reserves it holds, after consulting the Bank. In New Zealand, some reserves are 
held by the Treasury and other government agencies, with informal protocols rather than clear legal 
authorities governing their accessibility by the central bank. Overall, however, the vast majority of 
central banks participating in the survey regard the powers they are given in their respective central 
bank laws as sufficient to allow them to conduct the intervention policy they deem appropriate. 
                                                       
5   The precise meaning of the right to conduct exchange rate policy depends on the exchange rate regime chosen. For a 
floating exchange rate regime, this right would at least cover verbal interventions, and typically allows the central bank to 
conduct actual exchange rate interventions with its own reserves if it chooses to do so.  
6   The guidelines are set by the Foreign Exchange Commission, which comprises three members from the ministry of finance 
and three members from the central bank. The ministry of finance has ultimate control since the Minister of Finance has the 
power to decide in case of a tie, and any official decision by the commission must have at least one vote by a member from 
the ministry of finance in its favour.  
7   In the RBNZ’s case, while the Bank has the power to intervene on its own initiative, it bears the financial risk associated with 
the intervention. Where the government directs the Bank to intervene, the financial risk is transferred to the government. 
9   The Bank of England Act contains specific provisions concerning transparency with regard to foreign exchange interventions 
(see next section) but not on the decision-making process itself.  
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Decision-making inside the central bank 
The vast majority of central bank laws do not contain specific provisions applicable exclusively to the 
central bank’s arrangements for foreign exchange interventions or decision-making procedures for 
foreign exchange interventions. Instead, interventions are generally governed by the same rules as 
monetary policy decisions and actions, or as exchange rate policy matters if there are separate 
procedures for the latter (as is the case, for example, in Mexico).
9 
In practice, decisions on major interventions are usually reserved for the top decision-making authority 
within the central bank. Accordingly, such decisions are often the prerogative of the Board or the 
Governor (alone or under delegation from the Board, depending on the country and circumstances). 
The role of the central bank’s staff is usually to provide advice, although decision-making power for 
small interventions is frequently delegated to the department or trading room level (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Executive authority for small and 
large foreign exchange interventions 
 
A number of central bank practitioners stress the need for well developed internal decision-making 
procedures and guidelines on actual interventions. On the one hand, the trading desk has the most 
immediate access to market intelligence and typically a very good feel for the market, and delegating 
authority to the desk in deciding precisely where, when and how interventions are carried out can 
increase their effectiveness. This is especially relevant where the intervention strategy involves 
harnessing market dynamics to maximise impact on the exchange rate. Precise timing may be less of 
an issue where the objective of the intervention is, for example, to build reserves. Even then, however, 
most central banks have a concern to avoid adding volatility to the exchange rate, and detailed 
knowledge of current market dynamics can be valuable in that regard.
10 Interventions for reserve 
building purposes will often involve a concern to transact at financially favourable prices, which may 
also require detailed market knowledge to achieve (unless auction-based alternatives are used for that 
purpose).  
In addition, the market’s response to an intervention may require immediate follow-up actions (such as 
a second intervention) in order to get the central bank’s overall message across in full. If the mandate 
                                                       
10   The papers Motives for intervention and Foreign exchange market intervention: methods and tactics in this volume provide 
more discussion on these issues. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%  60% 
Governor 
Deputy Governor or Executive Director 
Executive Board 
Monetary Policy Board 
Department heads 
Department heads subject to limits or on request 
Trading desk 
Trading desk within guidelines 
Trading desk implementing automatic rules 
Other 
Small interventions 
Major interventions  
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for the trading desk is overly narrow, the absence (or even delay) of such follow-up can obscure the 
message and ultimately damage the central bank’s credibility. 
On the other hand, if interventions are believed to make a genuine difference to the policy 
performance of the central bank, they need to be guided by those who are in charge of policy 
decisions and are held accountable for them, not least because they can be costly in terms of both 
money and reputation. In practice, this tends to mean that delegations to the trading desk are 
relatively narrow, and the head of department retains close operational oversight of any intervention. 
Nor is (formal or informal) delegation to the head of department usually extensive, given the policy and 
political sensitivity of intervention. In order to reduce the potential for delay as tactics need to be 
modified in line with the market’s response, in most cases the central bank’s senior management will 
make themselves available for immediate consultation.  
The design of procedures and guidelines that strike the right balance between these two needs is 
probably not an easy task, and central banks may want to consider exchanging information in order to 
benefit from each other’s experience. Instructions issued by the US Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) provide an interesting example of a guideline that is in the public domain, particularly since its 
contents reflect the experience gained over a considerable period of time (see Annex 2 to this paper). 
Central banks may also wish to cooperate on exchanging information on codes of conduct and related 
procedures that are designed to ensure that advance knowledge of impending foreign exchange 




There has been an enormous increase in transparency on monetary policy in the past 10-15 years, 
reflecting the idea that a clearly specified monetary policy objective can be achieved more efficiently if 
markets and the public know how the central bank reads the economic situation and what determines 
its policy actions.
12 This increase in transparency coincided with (but typically was not primarily caused 
by) public demands for governments to become more transparent. Today, for many in the financial 
press and elsewhere a good central bank is a transparent central bank. 
Yet foreign exchange interventions by central banks are often conducted secretly, and in general this 
is well accepted in markets and compliant with central bank laws as well as with codes of best 
practice. For example, the Bank of England Act of 1998 contains stringent requirements for the 
Monetary Policy Committee to release information about its policy deliberations and decisions, but 
exempts intervention activities from these requirements.
13 And the IMF Code of Good Practices on 
                                                       
11   Details on the precise nature of information passed on via electronic communications by an administrative staff member at 
the Central Bank of Chile are not known, but the incident led to the resignation of the Bank’s Governor in 2003. 
12   Storgaard (2002) reviews this development with an emphasis on the role played by the choice of foreign exchange rate 
regime. 
13   The relevant part of the Bank of England Act is: “15. -  
(1)  After each meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, the Bank shall publish minutes of the meeting before the end 
of the period of six weeks beginning with the day of the meeting. 
(2) .... Subsection (1) shall not apply to minutes of any proceedings relating to- 
(a)  a decision to intervene in financial markets, or 
(b)  a decision about the publication of a decision to intervene in financial markets, unless the Committee has 
decided that publication of the decision to intervene would not be likely, or would no longer be likely, to impede 
or frustrate the achievement of the intervention’s purpose. 
(3)  Minutes of proceedings relating to- 
(a)  a decision to intervene in financial markets, or 
(b)  a decision about the publication of a decision to intervene in financial markets, shall, if not required to be 
published before the end of the period of six weeks beginning with the day of the meeting, be published by the 
Bank before the end of the period of six weeks beginning with the day on which a statement about the decision 
to intervene is published under section 14(5). 
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Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies recognises that “there are circumstances in which it 
would not be appropriate for central banks to disclose their near-term monetary and exchange rate 
implementation tactics and provide detailed information on foreign exchange operations”. The 
quotation contains part of the answer to the question of why there are valid limits for transparency on 
foreign exchange interventions: transparency about the objective need not be synonymous with 
transparency on related tools and tactics. Holub (in this volume), amongst others, points to a second 
reason: transparency about operations in the foreign exchange market may impede their 
effectiveness. 
The paper by Archer in this volume (Foreign exchange market intervention: methods and tactics) 
provides a discussion of the possible connections between transparency and effectiveness, and 
Mihaljek’s paper (Central banks’ views on foreign exchange intervention) draws together the 
perspectives of central banks. Holub (in this volume), in reviewing the Czech National Bank’s 
experience with various intervention tactics (including open and secret interventions), draws a 
conclusion that could also be a summary of these papers - namely that it is impossible to extract a 
mechanical rule: “Something that did work in one situation may have had little effect in another one”. 
The issue of transparency in the context of this paper has more to do with accountability than tactics. 
A prerequisite for effective accountability is information. That is clear in terms of information about 
implementation strategy, without which any assessment of consistency with stated policy would be 
very difficult. It may also be the case that information on tools and tactics is needed in order to assess 
actual performance against professed strategy. Quite frequently, central banks distinguish between 
information on strategy and on actual interventions that is released ex ante or ex post. Presumably, 
the former approach is intended to support the policy objectives of the central bank while the latter is 
deemed important for holding the central bank to account. At this point, if not before, the potential for 
tensions between possible harm to policy effectiveness and likely gains in accountability arising from 
full transparency becomes apparent, for one thing because ex post announcements on strategy or 
actual interventions are bound to influence market expectations for the future. It would not be 
surprising then if different judgments were reached in different circumstances on the appropriate 
balance to be struck. And that turns out to be the case for the group of central banks responding to the 
BIS survey. Tables 2a and 2b summarise practices with respect to releasing information on central 
banks’ intervention strategies as well as on actual interventions. 
To help identify potential linkages, Tables 2a and 2b include information on the size of the foreign 
exchange reserves central banks have available to conduct interventions, as well as on the principal 
motives behind interventions carried out in the past five years. The key point apparent is the absence 
of clear patterns linking the provision of information on interventions to size of foreign exchange 
reserves or motives for intervention. On the one hand, this means that the question whether (and if so, 
when) to publish information on intervention strategy and on actual interventions demands a detailed 
analysis (and perhaps some trial and error) because central bank practices vary so widely. On the 
other hand, the absence of a clear pattern of practices means that on this issue, central banks may 
have considerable room for choosing the communications approach they find works best in their 
circumstances.
14  
                                                                                                                                                                       
(4)  Minutes published under this section shall record, in relation to any decision of the Committee, the voting preference 
of the members who took part in the vote on the decision. 
(5)  Publication under this section shall be in such manner as the Bank thinks fit”. 
14   This is in contrast to, for example, communications on monetary policy, where central banks can be under strong pressure 
from market watchers or the financial press to adopt one particular model that these observers feel is clearly superior over 
others.   
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Table 2a 
Publication of information on intervention 
and level of foreign exchange reserves 
Level of foreign exchange reserves
1 
In absolute terms
2  In relative terms
3 
Information 
on …  When 
Low   High  Total  Low   High   Total 
Regularly   AR,  CZ, 
 HU,  IL 
 HK,  IN, 
 TR 
 7   CZ,  HK, 
 HU,  TR 
  AR, IL, IN   7 
If changed    CL, CO, 
 NZ,  ZA 
 BR,  MX   6   MX,  NZ, 
 ZA 
 BR,  CL, 
 CO 
 6 
Either or both   8   5   13   7   6   13 
No   PE,  PH, 
 VE   
 KR,  ID 
 MY,  PL, 
 SG,  TH 
   PH,  PL, 
 MY,  TH 
 KR,  ID, 




No   3   6   9   4   5   9 
Same day    AR, CO, 
 PE 
 BR,  MX   5   MX    AR,  BR, 
 CO,  PE 
 5 
Regularly   CL,  CZ, 
 IL,  ZA 
 HK   5   CZ,  HK, 
 ZA 
  CL, IL    5 
Either or both   7   3   10   4   6   10 
No guidelines/ 
mixed 
 NZ,  PH     2   NZ,  PH, 
 PL,  TR 
   4 
No    HU, VE    ID, IN, 
 KR,  MY, 
 PL,  SG, 
 TH,  TR 
 10   HU,  MY, 
 TH 
 ID,  IN, 




No, no guidelines/ 
mixed 
 4   8   12   7   5   12 
 AR,  CL, 
CZ, IL, ZA 
 BR,  HK, 
 MX 
   CZ,  HK, 
 MX,  ZA 
 AR,  BR, 
 CL,  CO, 
 IL 
  On strategy and on actual 
intervention 
5   3   8   4   5   9 
CO, HU, 
NZ, PE 
 IN,  TR     HU,  NZ, 
 TR 
 IN,  PE    On strategy or on actual 
intervention 
 4   2   6   3   2   5 
  PH, VE    ID, KR, 
 MY,  PL, 
 SG,  TH 
   PH,  PL, 
 MY,  TH 
 KR,  ID, 
 SG,  VE 
  Neither on strategy nor on 
actual intervention 
 2   6   8   4   4   8 
1  The classification into “Low” and “High” was done by splitting the sample into two groups of the same size.   
2  Classified 
according to the absolute size of the foreign exchange reserves at end-2003 in US dollar terms.   
3  Classified according to 
the size of the foreign exchange reserves relative to imports at end-2003. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS survey.  




Publication of information on 




on …  When 
Level Volatility  Moder-
ation 
Extreme 
events  Other 
No inter-
ventions 
Regularly  CZ, HU, tr  ar, cz, IN, 
TR 
CZ, hu  ar, CZ, hu  AR, HK  IL 
If changed  CL  br, CL, 
CO 
CL  br, CL, mx  BR, CO, 
MX, ZA 
NZ 
Either or both  4  7  3  6  6  2 















No  5  7  4  4  3  1 
Same day    ar, br, 
CO, PE 
PE  ar, br, mx  AR, BR, 
CO, MX 
 
Regularly  CL, CZ   CL, cz  CL, CZ   CL, CZ  HK, ZA  IL 
Either or both  2  6  3  5  6  1 
No guidelines/ 
mixed 
 PH   PH   NZ 
No  HU, ID, 










kr, MY,SG  PL 
Intervention 
No, no guidelines/ 
mixed  
7  8  4  5  3  2 
CL, CZ  ar, br, CL, 
CO, cz 





IL  On strategy and on actual 
intervention 
2  5  2  5  6  1 
HU, tr  IN, PE, 
TR 
hu, PE  hu    NZ  On strategy or on actual 
intervention 













PL  Neither on strategy nor on 
actual intervention 
5  6  3  4  3  1 
1  The columns represent the five choices offered in the BIS survey. Country codes in upper case mean that the motive 
applied in at least half of the years (in the period 2000-04) in which interventions were carried out; country codes are shown 
in lower case if the motive played a role less often. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS survey. 
 
A closer look, however, reveals three traces of a possible pattern in Tables 2a and 2b may still be 
worth discussing:  
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•  The majority of central banks provide information on intervention strategy; a smaller number 
provide information on actual interventions (and the number of institutions doing so tends to 
decline with the timeliness of the information).
15 
•  More information on actual interventions tends to be released if the objective is to affect the 
volatility rather than the level of the exchange rate. 
•  There may be an inverse relationship between absolute size of foreign exchange reserves and the 
amount of information released on interventions. Why this would be the case is difficult to say. 
Selected detailed aspects 
At least seven types of information concerning interventions may be distinguished: 
1.  Information on intervention strategy (eg in a periodic policy statement or an ad hoc 
announcement). 
2.  Open mouth interventions - here, the information is the intervention. 
3.  Real-time or near real-time information on actual interventions (eg newswire release, 
authorisation of counterparties to reveal information about the intervention). 
4.  Reports on actual interventions when they still may have a bearing on the market’s 
perception of central bank behaviour (eg a monthly report). 
5.  Information for the record (eg in the annual reports of the central bank). 
6.  Historical information (eg the release of intervention data or transcripts of policy meetings 
with a lag of a number of years). 
7.  Information released in response to incorrect information circulating in markets (are false 
rumours ignored or refuted?). 
The length of this list (which is probably not exhaustive) illustrates the usefulness of giving thought to a 
detailed communications strategy. Compared to the central bank’s overall strategy for policy 
communications, this strategy may need to define different sets of responsibilities depending on the 
degree of transparency chosen for a particular action, to consider in more detail the approaches that 
can be taken in emergency circumstances, and to be particularly mindful of maintaining a level playing 
field for all outside the central bank for whom the information may be of value. 
Concerning the technical issue of providing (or not providing) information to markets at the time of 
intervention actions, central banks have devised the following approaches: 
No information. The Bank of Korea intervenes through agents selected among major banks, and 
imposes a confidentiality requirement on them to maintain secrecy concerning the intervention 
(Rhee (2004)). 
Qualitative information. For the special case of a foreign exchange intervention, once the Bank of 
Canada has actually dealt through a broker, that broker may confirm to others that the Bank has dealt, 
provided the exact amount and price level are not revealed. The disclosure of any other information, in 
any other circumstance, is a breach of confidentiality.
16 
A contingent approach. In the United States, the Foreign Exchange Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York has two options between which it can select, depending on the circumstances. If it feels 
that it is useful for information on the Fed’s intervention to spread in markets, it can operate directly in 
the interbank market, allowing the bank that is counterparty to its trade to deal with the information as 
desired. News of such trades normally spreads quickly in the market, even though there is also some 
false information where a rumour of an intervention spreads without any intervention having taken 
                                                       
15   It is easy to speculate why this may be so - for instance, central banks may fear a loss of credibility and effectiveness if the 
extent of interventions (successful and unsuccessful) becomes known in detail, or they may be concerned that market 
participants may be able to extract their intervention rules from detailed data. Ultimately this is a question of tactics, and thus 
a matter for the paper by Archer in this volume. 
16   See “Letter on Confidentiality” (www.fmac.ca/Profess/confidentiality.html).  
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place. If the Desk does not want its intervention to become known it asks a commercial bank to place 
bids or offers in the brokers market, and the same principles of confidentiality apply as would if the 
action was taken on behalf of any other principal. 
Immediate information to counterparties/the public. When it conducted interventions in the past, the 
Swiss National Bank (SNB) dealt directly with foreign and domestic commercial banks operating in 
several Swiss cities (Fischer (2004)). After the completion of the transaction the SNB informed the 
counterparty that this had been an SNB intervention, and this information would spread quickly in the 
market. While the SNB made no formal announcement to news agencies it would confirm (or refute) 
rumours if asked by a newswire service that had picked up the information in the market. In Canada, a 
space is now reserved on the central bank’s website for announcement of interventions to the public, 
with the announcement being immediate.  
Announcement of a window and ceiling. In Chile, the central bank announced on 16 August 2001 that 
spot market interventions up to a maximum of USD 2 billion could occur until 31 December, and a 
similar announcement was made on 10 October 2002 for the period up to 10 February 2003 (Tapia 
and Tokman (2004)). 
Pre-announcement. In some countries (for example, Colombia, Mexico, Chile and Brazil) interventions 
are conducted by way of auctions. In such cases, auction parameters are announced in advance. 
Another interesting aspect is information flows from markets to the central bank. For example, when  
choosing which major banks to use as agents in its intervention operations two of the criteria The Bank 
of Korea uses are the ability of a bank to provide the central bank with instant market information, and 
its active role as a market-maker (see the contribution by Rhee in this volume). And last but not least, 
well functioning information flows between the central bank and the government are important. For 
instance, in the Czech Republic a special account was established at the central bank in early 2000 for 
foreign exchange privatisation revenues received by the government which had previously been a 
factor in the appreciation of the Czech koruna. The management of this account proved a useful 
vehicle for ongoing communication between the government and the central bank on foreign 
exchange matters (see Holub in this volume).  
Accountability 
Holding the central bank to account for intervention decisions is almost certainly more complex than 
accountability for the conduct of monetary policy. This is because interventions are actions on the 
margin; their impact is often extremely difficult to quantify, especially where the policy objective 
explicitly or implicitly involves altering the medium-term path of the exchange rate. In addition, an 
in-depth assessment of intervention actions would require a close familiarity with this complex and 
practice-oriented subject by the review body. At the same time, the financial consequences of 
intervention for the central bank and government accounts tend to be more obvious. This asymmetry 
creates an imbalance which can be highly problematic, and has at times led to severe subsequent 
difficulties for some decision-makers.  
Judging by the coverage of intervention strategies and actions in central banks’ annual reports (which 
in most cases remain their flagship publications for the purpose of official reviews and accountability), 
a legislator reviewing a central bank’s performance would typically find considerably more data and 
analysis for the overall conduct of monetary policy than for intervention actions. But there are also 
substantial differences in the approaches chosen by individual central banks. To illustrate, Table 3 
gives a qualitative picture of the information on intervention strategy and intervention actions that is 
provided in central bank press releases, regular or ad hoc reports, and annual reports. It should be 
stressed that this table is based on a broad comparison of central banks’ reports, and seeks to 
demonstrate similarities and differences in approach, without implying any rank ordering among them. 
At times, central banks and ministries of finance are challenged in the political sphere for their 
intervention actions. To name just two examples, Saxton (1999) demands a substantially more 
transparent US dollar policy, arguing in part that this is necessary to comply with the Government 
Performance and Results Act. And in Korea, there have been strong demands in the legislature for the 
ministry of finance to provide more information on its interventions. In addition, there are cases where 
central banks have been asked to justify why they chose not to intervene in exchange markets. A well 
known example is the SARB’s defence before the Myburgh Commission of not having intervened to 
stem the decline in the rand in the second half of 2001 (Cross (2002)). 
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Table 3 
Information on intervention strategy, 
actual interventions and in annual reports 
(Fuller circles signify more detailed information) 












Brazil  ◒  ◒  ◒  ◒ 
Chile  ◒  ◒  ◒  ◒ 
Czech Republic  ●  ◒  ●  ● 
Hungary  ●  ○  ●  ◒ 
India  ●  ○  ○  ◔ 
Indonesia  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
Korea  ○  ○  ◒  ○ 
Mexico  ◒  ●  ◒  ◒ 
Peru  ○  ●  ●  ◒ 
Singapore  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
Turkey  ●  ○  ●  ◒ 
 
Resources and accounting 
Closely linked to the question of accountability is the financial impact of intervention on the central 
bank, the government and, ultimately, the taxpayer. Friedman’s (1953) argument that successful 
(stabilising) intervention should be profitable has been disputed by several authors (eg Neely (2000)), 
and it cannot be claimed that foreign exchange interventions need to be profitable in order to be 
welfare-enhancing (Murray et al (1990)). Achieving profits is not a primary objective for central banks, 
and net gains or losses from intervention operations should therefore not be a principal concern of 
policy, it is argued. Nonetheless, legislators and the general public tend to treat large official sector 
losses as prima facie evidence of failure. Moreover, given the difficulty in measuring the benefits of 
intervention, the defence that higher public policy goals have primacy is difficult to support with 
concrete evidence. Not surprisingly, therefore, Neely (2000) reports that although in a formal survey 
no central bank said that profitability was a consideration when intervention decisions were made, in 
conversation several central bankers said that the profitability of interventions was considered when 
assessing the central bank’s stewardship of public resources. 
All central banks participating in the BIS survey bear the initial costs of their foreign exchange 
interventions since they are carried out with foreign exchange reserves that are owned by the central 
bank or at least are on its balance sheet. Even so, ultimately the financial costs (or profits) from 
interventions are typically borne by the government and the public at large. They will eventually be 
reflected in the net surplus that the central bank transfers to the government, after deducting its 
operating costs and building reserves, as provided in the central bank law or in agreements between 
the central bank and the government. In Brazil, the foreign exchange reserves are owned by the 
government, and the government needs to compensate the central bank for related losses (but also 
receives all related profits). 
As long as it does not create perverse incentives, the accounting approach that is used for the foreign 
exchange reserves (and thus for interventions) does not matter in the long term. However, the 
implications of choosing a particular type of valuation and recognition approach can be substantial on  
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a quarterly or annual basis, and it is important that the choice of approach be consistent with the rule 
governing the transfer of surpluses from the central bank to government (or the sharing of losses).
17  
Table 4 provides a stylised summary of the accounting policies followed by survey participants for their 
foreign exchange reserves.
18 In all cases for which the information is available, fair value accounting is 
used, but there are significant differences in the way income is recognised. The most frequent 
approach is to build up a revaluation account from unrealised gains and losses which are thus 
reflected in the central bank’s balance sheet but not in its statement of profits and losses. 
 
Table 4 
Accounting approaches for 
foreign exchange reserves 
Exchange rate revaluation 
Income recognition of 
exchange revaluation 





































Chile     ●    ●    
Czech Republic        ●
1    ●    
Hong Kong SAR        ●    ●    
Hungary       ●      ● 
India       ●
2      ● 
Israel       ●
1  ●    ●   
Korea       ●      ● 
Malaysia       ●
3      ● 
Mexico       ●
3      ● 
Peru       ●      ● 
Philippines       ●      ● 
Poland       ●
3      ● 
South Africa        ●      ● 
Turkey       ●      ● 
1  As of every month-end.   
2  As of every week-end and month-end.   
3  Daily. 
 
                                                       
17   The report of the Study Group on Central Bank Capital (2005) contains a detailed discussion of this issue. 
18   The table and the associated classification were prepared by Christine Padua.   
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Coordination with government on debt management 
Foreign exchange intervention can be defined as any operation that has the effect of altering the net 
foreign exchange position of the public sector - not just the central bank.
19 Thus, there is an indirect 
link between intervention policy and foreign currency debt management when debt management 
decisions involve changing the currency composition of the government’s debt portfolio and/or the 
currency exposure of the government’s debt service obligations. In some countries that link can even 
be quite direct. In Brazil, for example, changes in the currency denomination of new debt issues have 
been implemented in a manner akin to an intervention tool to reduce the extent of exchange rate 
depreciation in crisis circumstances (in part by providing an onshore hedging instrument for the private 
sector). The index-linking of debt to foreign currencies has also been used in a similar manner, for 
example in Chile and Peru. 
In the majority of cases in the survey, the governance arrangements accommodating this link (as well 
as information sharing on debt management more generally) involve a coordination mechanism 
between the central bank and the public sector entity responsible for debt management. Specifically, 
in 74% of the cases, government debt is managed by the ministry of finance, and the remainder is split 
about evenly between debt management by a debt management agency or by the central bank. In 




Examples of coordination mechanisms 
between the central bank and the government 
in the area of debt management 
Brazil  The central bank and the ministry of finance determine and announce each year the 
volume of bonds to be issued. On the operational side, the central bank acts on behalf of 
the Treasury and carries out debt issuance transactions in the external market following the 
decisions taken in a coordination committee named Codex, which holds monthly meetings 
between the central bank and the Treasury on external debt matters. 
Hong  Kong  SAR  The HKMA is an independent organisation with responsibility over monetary policy 
including the management of foreign exchange reserves, while the management of the 
HKSAR government’s fiscal position, including the foreign currency debt, is the 
responsibility of the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau. Both institutions are 
under the oversight of the Financial Secretary, who has overall responsibility for financial 
and economic policy formulation and implementation. 
Hungary  •  The central bank provides a formal opinion on the annual borrowing plan of the debt 
management office, especially concerning the ratio of foreign currency borrowing.  
•  The central bank is represented on the board of the debt management office. 
•  A contract between the central bank and the debt management office sets out the 
detailed division of tasks in the area of foreign currency debt management. In case of 
extraordinary market circumstances, the debt management office borrows on the 
request of the central bank to fill up reserves. 
India  The government has constituted a liability management group which includes a 
representative from the central bank. The key objective of this group is to ensure better 
management of external liabilities, including prepayment of high-cost debts of the 
government. 
 
                                                       
19   Intervention via the expectations channel, using “open mouth operations”, is left aside.  
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Table 5 (cont) 
Examples of coordination mechanisms 
between the central bank and the government 
in the area of debt management 
Malaysia  Regular meetings are conducted between institutions to discuss operational and strategic 
issues such as the cash flow position and projections. In addition, ad hoc meetings to 
discuss issues such as refinancing and bond issuance are held. 
Mexico  The central bank acts as financial agent for the government and in this capacity manages 
some of the government’s foreign assets (which are not included in the official definition of 
international reserves) and carries out foreign debt service on behalf of the government 
(operational issues only). 
Philippines  • Membership of a government representative on the Monetary Board and 
membership/presence of central bank representatives in inter-agency groups or 
committees that are directly or indirectly responsible for managing the government’s 
foreign currency borrowings. 
•  Submission to the central bank by the national government and by government-owned 
and/or -controlled corporations, including government financial institutions, of their 
annual borrowing plans. 
•  Close monitoring by the central bank of foreign exchange requirements of the public 
and private sectors, eg for servicing foreign currency obligations and proceeds from 
new loans. 
•  Comprehensive monitoring of the country’s external debt and profile (ie maturity, 
currency, composition, etc) vis-à-vis foreign exchange reserves. 
South Africa  Separate committees with joint representation coordinate and execute the policy of the 
national treasury and the central bank. 
Thailand  Foreign currency debt is administered by the National Debt Committee, which is chaired by 
the Minister of Finance. The Governor of the Bank of Thailand is a member. 
 
In Chile and Israel there is no coordination between the central bank and the institution managing the 
foreign currency debt, but the central bank considers the currency composition of foreign currency 
debt (over a one-year horizon in Chile and a five-year horizon in Israel) explicitly when determining the 
currency composition of the foreign exchange reserves. 
Conclusion 
Governance is an important and topical aspect of institution building. Concerning foreign exchange 
intervention, three governance issues may be highlighted. The broadest is the allocation of powers for 
monetary policy and for exchange rate policy. The more narrow is decision-making on interventions at 
the operational level. And the third concerns transparency and accountability for the exercise of 
independent authority.   
On the broad issue, close links between monetary policy and the exchange rate mean that policy 
interests in each area cannot be treated separately. Even so, it is quite common for central bank laws 
to obscure who has the power over exchange rate policy. At the operational level, governance 
arrangements for interventions are also more opaque than for monetary policy. This is notable, since 
interventions are often carried out in secret, and might thus need tighter governance arrangements 
than otherwise. Well-considered procedures are also necessary to make the best use of public funds 
once the decision to intervene has been taken in principle. The trading desk is best placed to assess 
the most effective timing and tactics, yet the many nuances of policy decision-making in this area limit 
the ability of those in charge of policy (Governor or Board) to delegate decision authority.  
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Turning to transparency and accountability, the paradigm today is that a good central bank is a 
transparent central bank. Foreign exchange interventions are a remarkable exception, reflecting the 
concern that too much transparency on interventions may impede their effectiveness. Related views 
and practices among central banks differ widely, but there is a shared concern to make a sufficient 
amount of information available at least ex post in order to facilitate the central bank being held to 
account for its intervention actions.   
34  BIS Papers No 24
 
Annex 1: 
Selected information on foreign 
exchange reserves and interventions 
Size of foreign 
exchange reserves 
(FXR) 
Information on actual 
interventions 
is published 



































Flexible exchange rate arrangements 
India   114    19  ●   100    CB  R  N       
Indonesia   33    12  ●   ?    CB  N  N       
Korea   166    11  ●   80   Mixed
3 N  N       
Philippines   13    4  ○   100    CB  N  Some
4    
Singapore   101    10  ●   100    CB  N  N       
Thailand   42    7  ●   98   CB  N  N       
Argentina   16    14  R    100    CB  R Y Y  Y Y 
Brazil   50    12  ●    0   CB  C  Y  Y     
Chile   15    10  R    100    CB  C  Y    B   
Colombia   11    9  R    100    CB  C  Y Y    
Mexico    59    4  A    100  CB and G 
 jointly 
C Y  Y    
Peru   10    15  R    51    CB  N  Y  Y     
Czech Republic    26    6  ○   100    CB  R  Y  E
5   Y
6 
Hungary   12    3  ○   100    CB  R  N
7      
Poland   36    7  A    100    CB  N  N       
Israel   26    9  R    100    CB  R  Y      Y 
New Zealand    3    2  ○   100    CB  C 
8      
South Africa    9    3  ○   100    CB  C  Y      Y 
Turkey   34    6  A    100    CB  R  N       
Fixed exchange rate or very narrow band 
Hong Kong SAR     121    6  A    0   CB  R  Y      Y 
Malaysia   53    8  A    100    G  after 
 consulting
 CB 
N N       
Venezuela   18    25  R    97    CB  N  N       
1  This field combines the entries in the two numeric fields on foreign exchange reserves. ● = high reserves both in absolute terms and 
relative to imports; A = high reserves only in absolute terms; R = high reserves only relative to imports; and ○ = a low level of reserves 
both in absolute terms and relative to imports. (See footnote for Tables 2a and 2b for details.)     
2  CB  =  central  bank; 
G = government.   
3  For reserves owned by The Bank of Korea, central bank after consulting government; for reserves owned by the 
government, government after consulting central bank.     
4    The volume of the central bank’s outstanding non-deliverable forward 
transactions is published on its website with a one-month lag from the reference period. Data on other forms of intervention are not 
published.   
5  E = exceptionally.   
6  Minutes of the meeting; Inflation Report; the central bank’s website.   
7  One exception was the 
announcement of the foreign exchange auctions in the aftermath of the January 2003 attack on the strong end of the band.   
8  No 
guidelines established on this point.  
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Annex 2:  
Authorization for foreign currency operations, foreign currency directive and 
related procedural instructions by the US Federal Open Market Committee
20 
“By unanimous vote, the Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations was reaffirmed in the form 
shown below. 
AUTHORIZATION FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY OPERATIONS 
1. The Federal Open Market Committee authorizes and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, for System Open Market Account, to the extent necessary to carry out the Committee's foreign 
currency directive and express authorizations by the Committee pursuant thereto, and in conformity 
with such procedural instructions as the Committee may issue from time to time: 
A. To purchase and sell the following foreign currencies in the form of cable transfers through spot or 
forward transactions on the open market at home and abroad, including transactions with the U.S. 
Treasury, with the U.S. Exchange Stabilization Fund established by Section 10 of the Gold Reserve 
Act of 1934, with foreign monetary authorities, with the Bank for International Settlements, and with 










B. To hold balances of, and to have outstanding forward contracts to receive or to deliver, the foreign 
currencies listed in paragraph A above. 
C. To draw foreign currencies and to permit foreign banks to draw dollars under the reciprocal 
currency arrangements listed in paragraph 2 below, provided that drawings by either party to any such 
arrangement shall be fully liquidated within 12 months after any amount outstanding at that time was 
first drawn, unless the Committee, because of exceptional circumstances, specifically authorizes a 
delay. 
D. To maintain an overall open position in all foreign currencies not exceeding $25.0 billion. For this 
purpose, the overall open position in all foreign currencies is defined as the sum (disregarding signs) 
of net positions in individual currencies. The net position in a single foreign currency is defined as 
holdings of balances in that currency, plus outstanding contracts for future receipt, minus outstanding 
contracts for future delivery of that currency, i.e., as the sum of these elements with due regard to 
sign. 
2. The Federal Open Market Committee directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to maintain 
reciprocal currency arrangements ("swap" arrangements) for the System Open Market Account for 
periods up to a maximum of 12 months with the following foreign banks, which are among those 
designated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under Section 214.5 of 
Regulation N, Relations with Foreign Banks and Bankers, and with the approval of the Committee to 
renew such arrangements on maturity: 
                                                       
20   The latest version was adopted at and published in the minutes of the January 2004 meeting of the FOMC, and is excerpted 
here. Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/FOMC/minutes/20040128.htm. Section headings are not shown in bold in the 
original.  
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Foreign bank  Amount of arrangement 
(millions of dollars equivalent) 
Bank of Canada  2,000 
Bank of Mexico  3,000 
 
Any changes in the terms of existing swap arrangements, and the proposed terms of any new 
arrangements that may be authorized, shall be referred for review and approval to the Committee. 
3. All transactions in foreign currencies undertaken under paragraph 1.A. above shall, unless 
otherwise expressly authorized by the Committee, be at prevailing market rates. For the purpose of 
providing an investment return on System holdings of foreign currencies or for the purpose of adjusting 
interest rates paid or received in connection with swap drawings, transactions with foreign central 
banks may be undertaken at non-market exchange rates. 
4. It shall be the normal practice to arrange with foreign central banks for the coordination of foreign 
currency transactions. In making operating arrangements with foreign central banks on System 
holdings of foreign currencies, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall not commit itself to 
maintain any specific balance, unless authorized by the Federal Open Market Committee. Any 
agreements or understandings concerning the administration of the accounts maintained by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York with the foreign banks designated by the Board of Governors 
under Section 214.5 of Regulation N shall be referred for review and approval to the Committee. 
5. Foreign currency holdings shall be invested to ensure that adequate liquidity is maintained to meet 
anticipated needs and so that each currency portfolio shall generally have an average duration of no 
more than 18 months (calculated as Macaulay duration). When appropriate in connection with 
arrangements to provide investment facilities for foreign currency holdings, U.S. Government 
securities may be purchased from foreign central banks under agreements for repurchase of such 
securities within 30 calendar days. 
6. All operations undertaken pursuant to the preceding paragraphs shall be reported promptly to the 
Foreign Currency Subcommittee and the Committee. The Foreign Currency Subcommittee consists of 
the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee, the Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors, 
and such other member of the Board as the Chairman may designate (or in the absence of members 
of the Board serving on the Subcommittee, other Board members designated by the Chairman as 
alternates, and in the absence of the Vice Chairman of the Committee, his alternate). Meetings of the 
Subcommittee shall be called at the request of any member, or at the request of the Manager, System 
Open Market Account ("Manager"), for the purposes of reviewing recent or contemplated operations 
and of consulting with the Manager on other matters relating to his responsibilities. At the request of 
any member of the Subcommittee, questions arising from such reviews and consultations shall be 
referred for determination to the Federal Open Market Committee. 
7. The Chairman is authorized: 
A. With the approval of the Committee, to enter into any needed agreement or understanding with the 
Secretary of the Treasury about the division of responsibility for foreign currency operations between 
the System and the Treasury; 
B. To keep the Secretary of the Treasury fully advised concerning System foreign currency operations, 
and to consult with the Secretary on policy matters relating to foreign currency operations; 
C. From time to time, to transmit appropriate reports and information to the National Advisory Council 
on International Monetary and Financial Policies. 
8. Staff officers of the Committee are authorized to transmit pertinent information on System foreign 
currency operations to appropriate officials of the Treasury Department. 
9. All Federal Reserve Banks shall participate in the foreign currency operations for System Account in 
accordance with paragraph 3G(1) of the Board of Governors' Statement of Procedure with Respect to 
Foreign Relationships of Federal Reserve Banks dated January 1, 1944. 
By unanimous vote, the Foreign Currency Directive was reaffirmed in the form shown below.  
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FOREIGN CURRENCY DIRECTIVE 
1. System operations in foreign currencies shall generally be directed at countering disorderly   
market conditions, provided that market exchange rates for the U.S. dollar reflect actions and   
behavior consistent with IMF Article IV, Section 1. 
2. To achieve this end the System shall: 
A. Undertake spot and forward purchases and sales of foreign exchange. 
B. Maintain reciprocal currency ("swap") arrangements with selected foreign central banks. 
C. Cooperate in other respects with central banks of other countries and with international   
monetary institutions. 
3. Transactions may also be undertaken: 
A. To adjust System balances in light of probable future needs for currencies. 
B. To provide means for meeting System and Treasury commitments in particular currencies,   
and to facilitate operations of the Exchange Stabilization Fund. 
C. For such other purposes as may be expressly authorized by the Committee. 
4. System foreign currency operations shall be conducted: 
A. In close and continuous consultation and cooperation with the United States Treasury; 
B. In cooperation, as appropriate, with foreign monetary authorities; and 
C. In a manner consistent with the obligations of the United States in the International Monetary Fund 
regarding exchange arrangements under IMF Article IV. 
By unanimous vote, the Procedural Instructions with Respect to Foreign Currency Operations were 
reaffirmed in the form shown below. 
PROCEDURAL INSTRUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN CURRENCY OPERATIONS 
In conducting operations pursuant to the authorization and direction of the Federal Open Market 
Committee as set forth in the Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations and the Foreign Currency 
Directive, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, through the Manager, System Open Market 
Account ("Manager"), shall be guided by the following procedural understandings with respect to 
consultations and clearances with the Committee, the Foreign Currency Subcommittee, and the 
Chairman of the Committee. All operations undertaken pursuant to such clearances shall be reported 
promptly to the Committee. 
1. The Manager shall clear with the Subcommittee (or with the Chairman, if the Chairman 
believes that consultation with the Subcommittee is not feasible in the time available): 
A. Any operation that would result in a change in the System's overall open position in foreign 
currencies exceeding $300 million on any day or $600 million since the most recent regular   
meeting of the Committee. 
B. Any operation that would result in a change on any day in the System's net position in a   
single foreign currency exceeding $150 million, or $300 million when the operation is   
associated with repayment of swap drawings. 
C. Any operation that might generate a substantial volume of trading in a particular currency by   
the System, even though the change in the System's net position in that currency might be   
less than the limits specified in 1.B. 
D. Any swap drawing proposed by a foreign bank not exceeding the larger of (i) $200 million   
or (ii) 15 percent of the size of the swap arrangement. 
2. The Manager shall clear with the Committee (or with the Subcommittee, if the Subcommittee   
believes that consultation with the full Committee is not feasible in the time available, or with   
the Chairman, if the Chairman believes that consultation with the Subcommittee is not feasible   
in the time available):  
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A. Any operation that would result in a change in the System's overall open position in foreign   
currencies exceeding $1.5 billion since the most recent regular meeting of the Committee. 
B. Any swap drawing proposed by a foreign bank exceeding the larger of (i) $200 million or   
(ii) 15 percent of the size of the swap arrangement. 
3. The Manager shall also consult with the Subcommittee or the Chairman about proposed swap  
drawings by the System and about any operations that are not of a routine character.”  
BIS Papers No 24  39
 
References 
Aghion, P, P Bacchetta and A Banerjee (2004): “Financial development and the instability of open 
economies”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol 51, pp 1077-106. 
Burnside, C, M Eichenbaum and S Rebelo (2004): “Government guarantees and self-fulfilling 
speculative attacks”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol 119, November. 
Calvo, G A and C M Reinhart (2000): “Fixing for your life”, NBER Working Papers, no 8006. 
——— (2000): “Fear of floating”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 117, pp 379-408. 
Chiu, P (2003): “Transparency versus constructive ambiguity in foreign exchange intervention”, BIS 
Working Papers, no 144, October. 
Cross, J (2002): Explanation of the net open forward position to the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Rapid Depreciation of the Exchange Rate of the Rand (available on http://www.doj.gov.za/ 
2004dojsite/commissions/comm_rand.htm). 
Dooley, M P, D Folkerts-Landau and P Garber (2003): “An essay on the revived Bretton Woods 
system”, NBER Working Papers, no 9971, September. 
Fischer, A M (2004): Reuters news reports versus official interventions: the inaccuracy of Reuters 
reports for Swiss interventions, February. 
Friedman, M (1953): “The case for flexible exchange rates”, Essays in Positive Economics, University 
of Chicago Press, pp 157-203. 
Goldstein, I and A Pauzner (2004): “Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of 
investment portfolios”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol 119, Issue I, November. 
Hausman, R, U Panizza and E Stein (2000): “Why do countries float the way they float?”, mimeo, 
Inter-American Development Bank, April. 
King, M R (2003): “Effective foreign exchange intervention: matching strategies with objectives”, 
Journal of International Finance, vol 6, no 2, pp 247-69. 
Mboweni, T T (2002): Statement to the Commission of Inquiry into the Rapid Depreciation of the 
Exchange Rate of the Rand (available on www.reservebank.co.za). 
Murray, J, M Zelmer and S Williamson (1990): “Measuring the profitability and effectiveness of foreign 
exchange market intervention: some Canadian evidence”, Bank of Canada Technical Report, no 53. 
Neely, C J (2000): “The practice of central bank intervention: looking under the hood”, The Regional 
Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, May-June, pp 1-10. 
Saxton, J (1999): “Transparency and US dollar policy”, Joint Economic Committee, United States 
Congress, July. 
Storgaard, P E (2002): “Exchange-rate regimes and transparency”, Danmarks Nationalbank Monetary 
Review, 3rd Quarter, pp 59-69. 
Study Group on Central Bank Capital (2005): Central Bank Capital, unpublished report for use by the 
central bank community. 
Tapia, M and A Tokman (2004): “Effects of foreign exchange intervention under public information: the 
Chilean case”, Economia, LACEA, vol 4, Spring, pp 1-42. 